What does the AQA A-Level Philosophy moral philosophy module cover?

Moral philosophy (section 4.1.2) has three parts. First, three normative theories: utilitarianism (Bentham and Mill, act and rule, and preference utilitarianism), Kantian deontological ethics (the good will, duty and the categorical imperative), and Aristotelian virtue ethics (eudaimonia, the doctrine of the mean and practical wisdom). Second, applied ethics: applying all three theories to stealing, simulated killing, eating animals and telling lies. Third, metaethics: cognitivism and non-cognitivism, moral realism, error theory, emotivism and prescriptivism.

How is moral philosophy examined in AQA A-Level Philosophy?

Moral philosophy is examined in Paper 1 alongside epistemology. Expect short explain questions, twelve mark evaluations of a single argument, and twenty-five mark essays such as comparing two normative theories on an issue or assessing whether moral judgements are truth-apt. The named philosophers and set arguments must be accurate, and applied ethics questions require you to reach a verdict on the specific issue.

What is the difference between act and rule utilitarianism?

Act utilitarianism judges each individual action by the happiness it produces, so it is flexible but can demand laborious calculation and permit intuitively wrong acts. Rule utilitarianism judges actions by whether they follow rules whose general adoption maximises happiness, which better protects justice and promises but risks collapsing back into act utilitarianism when rule-breaking would maximise utility.

What is the difference between normative ethics and metaethics?

Normative ethics asks which actions are right or wrong and offers theories (utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics) that answer the question. Metaethics steps back and asks what moral judgements mean and whether there are moral facts: whether moral claims are truth-apt (cognitivism) or express attitudes (non-cognitivism), and whether mind-independent moral facts exist (realism, anti-realism, error theory).

How should I revise the moral philosophy module?

Learn each normative theory and its set objections precisely, then practise running all three over the four applied issues, reaching a clear verdict each time. For metaethics, master the cognitivism and non-cognitivism distinction and the named arguments (Hume's is-ought gap, Moore's open question and naturalistic fallacy, Mackie's error theory, emotivism and prescriptivism). Drill comparison and evaluation under timed conditions.

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AQA A-Level Philosophy 4.1.2 Moral philosophy: a complete overview of utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, applied ethics and metaethics

A deep-dive AQA A-Level Philosophy guide to the moral philosophy module (4.1.2). Covers the three normative theories (utilitarianism, Kantian deontology and Aristotelian virtue ethics), their application to the four set issues in applied ethics, and metaethics (cognitivism, non-cognitivism, realism and error theory), with the named philosophers and arguments examiners expect.

Generated by Claude Opus 4.823 min read4.1.2Updated 2026-06-02

Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed

Jump to a section

What the moral philosophy module demands
The three normative theories
Applied ethics
Metaethics
How moral philosophy is examined
Check your knowledge

What the moral philosophy module demands

Moral philosophy is the largest module by content, and it has a clear three-part shape: the three normative theories, the application of those theories to four set issues, and the metaethical question of what moral language means. The examiners test precise recall of each theory and named argument, the ability to apply theories to concrete cases, and sustained evaluation with a defended conclusion.

This guide walks through the three normative theories, then applied ethics, then metaethics, and finishes with the exam patterns AQA repeats. Each topic has a matching dot-point page with practice questions; this overview ties them together.

The three normative theories

Utilitarianism is consequentialist: the right action maximises happiness. Bentham's act utilitarianism measures pleasure with the felicific calculus; Mill adds higher and lower pleasures judged by competent judges; rule utilitarianism applies the principle to rules; and preference utilitarianism (Singer) maximises preference-satisfaction. The set objections include calculation, Nozick's experience machine, fairness and rights, partiality, and the tyranny of the majority.

Kantian deontological ethics grounds morality in reason. Only a good will acting from duty has moral worth. The categorical imperative (an unconditional command, unlike a hypothetical imperative) has two set formulations: the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity (never treat persons merely as a means), with perfect and imperfect duties. Objections include conflicting duties, the lying-to-the-murderer case, and the neglect of partiality and emotion.

Aristotelian virtue ethics is agent-centred. The good is eudaimonia, established by the function argument; virtues are dispositions acquired by habituation, each a mean between excess and deficiency, exercised through practical wisdom (phronesis), with responsibility tied to voluntary action. Objections include the guidance problem, circularity, clashing virtues and cultural relativity.

Applied ethics

Applied ethics tests whether you can run all three theories over four issues: stealing, simulated killing, eating animals and telling lies. Utilitarianism judges each by net consequences, so its verdicts vary. Kantian ethics applies universalisability and the means-end principle, giving firm prohibitions on stealing and lying. Virtue ethics asks what a person of good character with practical wisdom would do. The exam reward is a clear verdict on the specific issue, with the reasoning shown.

Metaethics

Metaethics asks what moral judgements mean. Cognitivism treats them as truth-apt beliefs; non-cognitivism treats them as non-truth-apt expressions of attitude. Among cognitivists, moral realism comes as naturalism (good reduces to a natural property) and non-naturalism (Moore: good is a simple non-natural property), while Mackie's error theory is cognitivist but anti-realist (all moral claims are false). The key arguments are Hume's is-ought gap, Moore's open question argument and naturalistic fallacy, and Mackie's arguments from relativity and queerness. The non-cognitivist theories are emotivism (Ayer) and prescriptivism (Hare), with the problem of moral motivation in the background.

How moral philosophy is examined

A typical AQA profile for this module:

Short explain questions (3 and 5 marks). Define a hypothetical imperative, explain the doctrine of the mean, or outline the verification of an emotivist claim.
Application questions. Explain how a Kantian or utilitarian assesses lying, stealing or eating animals, with a verdict.
Twelve mark evaluation. Assess a single objection, such as the experience machine against hedonism.
Twenty-five mark essays. Sustained evaluation comparing theories or assessing a metaethical claim, such as "Are moral judgements expressions of feeling?", requiring a defended conclusion.

Check your knowledge

A mix of recall and short evaluation questions covering module 4.1.2. Attempt them under timed conditions, then check against the solutions.

Explain Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures. (5 marks)
Explain the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative. (5 marks)
Outline the Formula of Humanity. (3 marks)
Explain Aristotle's doctrine of the mean using an example. (5 marks)
Explain how a Kantian would assess telling a lie. (5 marks)
Outline a utilitarian argument against eating factory-farmed animals. (5 marks)
Explain the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism. (5 marks)
Outline Mackie's argument from queerness. (5 marks)

Solutions

Q1: Higher pleasures are intellectual and mental; lower pleasures are bodily. Higher pleasures are superior in quality, not just quantity, and the test is the verdict of competent judges who have experienced both.
Q2: A hypothetical imperative commands a means to a desired end and binds only conditionally; a categorical imperative commands unconditionally and applies to all rational agents regardless of desire. Moral duties are categorical.
Q3: Treat humanity, in yourself or others, always as an end in itself and never merely as a means, respecting persons as rational agents with dignity.
Q4: A virtue lies at the mean between excess and deficiency relative to us: courage is the mean between rashness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency); the mean is fixed by the situation, not a strict midpoint.
Q5: The maxim of lying cannot be universalised without contradiction (universal lying destroys trust and so the point of assertion) and treats the hearer merely as a means, so lying violates a perfect duty.
Q6: Sentient animals can suffer, that suffering counts equally (Bentham, Singer), and the suffering caused by factory farming outweighs the pleasure humans gain from the meat, so it is wrong.
Q7: Cognitivism: moral judgements express truth-apt beliefs that describe reality. Non-cognitivism: they express non-belief states (attitudes or prescriptions) and are not truth-apt.
Q8: Objective moral values would be metaphysically and epistemologically strange, unlike anything else we know and requiring a special faculty to detect; it is more reasonable to deny they exist, so moral claims that presuppose them are false.

Sources & how we know this

AQA A-level Philosophy (7172) specification — AQA (2017)