What does the AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind module cover?

The metaphysics of mind (section 4.2.2) covers the mind-body problem and the features a theory must explain (intentionality, qualia, consciousness and privacy), then the main theories: dualism (substance and property), physicalist theories (logical behaviourism, the mind-brain type identity theory and eliminative materialism), and functionalism. It also treats the problem of qualia and consciousness directly through the knowledge argument and the philosophical zombies argument.

How is the metaphysics of mind examined in AQA A-Level Philosophy?

It is examined in Paper 2 alongside the metaphysics of God. Expect short explain questions, twelve mark evaluations of a single argument, and twenty-five mark essays such as assessing dualism, functionalism or whether physicalism can account for qualia. The named philosophers and set thought experiments must be accurate.

What is multiple realisability and why does it matter?

Multiple realisability is the claim that the same mental state can be realised in very different physical systems (humans, octopuses, perhaps silicon machines). It is the decisive objection to the mind-brain type identity theory, because if pain is identical to one specific brain state then nothing with different physiology could be in pain. It is the main motivation for functionalism, which defines mental states by role rather than physical make-up.

Why are qualia such a problem for physicalism?

Qualia are the subjective, felt qualities of experience, the what it is like of seeing red or feeling pain. Two arguments use them against physicalism: the knowledge argument (Mary learns something new on first seeing red despite knowing all the physical facts) and the zombie argument (a physical duplicate of a person could lack consciousness). Both suggest the phenomenal facts outrun the physical facts.

How should I revise the metaphysics of mind module?

Map each theory against the four features a theory of mind must explain, then learn each theory's set objections (for example the interaction problem for dualism, multiple realisability for identity theory, circularity for behaviourism, and inverted or absent qualia for functionalism). Master the named thought experiments (Mary, philosophical zombies, the China brain) precisely and rehearse twenty-five mark essays with a defended conclusion.

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AQA A-Level Philosophy 4.2.2 Metaphysics of mind: a complete overview of the mind-body problem, dualism, physicalism, functionalism and consciousness

A deep-dive AQA A-Level Philosophy guide to the metaphysics of mind module (4.2.2). Covers the mind-body problem, dualism, physicalist theories (behaviourism, identity theory and eliminative materialism), functionalism, and the problem of qualia and consciousness, with the named philosophers and arguments examiners expect.

Generated by Claude Opus 4.822 min read4.2.2Updated 2026-06-02

Reviewed by: AI editorial process; not yet individually human-reviewed

Jump to a section

What the metaphysics of mind module demands
The mind-body problem
Dualism
Physicalist theories
Functionalism
Qualia and consciousness
How the metaphysics of mind is examined
Check your knowledge

What the metaphysics of mind module demands

The metaphysics of mind asks how mental states relate to the physical body and brain, then runs a tournament of theories against the features mental states seem to have. The examiners test precise recall of each theory and its named thought experiments, and sustained evaluation that weighs a theory against its objections to a defended conclusion.

This guide walks through the mind-body problem, the rival theories, and the problem of consciousness, then sets out the exam patterns AQA repeats. Each topic has a matching dot-point page with practice questions; this overview ties them together.

The mind-body problem

The module begins by setting up the problem and the features any theory must explain: intentionality (the aboutness of mental states), qualia (the felt qualities of experience), consciousness, and the privacy and first-person access of mental states. Theories are also judged by whether they explain causal interaction between mind and body and cohere with science, including the conservation of energy.

Dualism

Substance dualism (Descartes) holds the mind is a distinct non-physical substance, argued via the conceivability argument (mind and body can be clearly and distinctly conceived apart) and the divisibility argument (the body is divisible, the mind is not). Property dualism holds there is one substance but irreducible non-physical properties, supported by the zombie and knowledge arguments. The decisive objection is the problem of interaction (Princess Elisabeth) and the related conservation-of-energy worry, plus Ryle's category mistake charge.

Physicalist theories

Three physicalist theories are set. Logical behaviourism (Ryle, Hempel) analyses mental states as behaviour and dispositions, attacked for circularity and the asymmetry of self-knowledge. The mind-brain type identity theory (Place, Smart) says each type of mental state is a type of brain state, an a posteriori ontological reduction like water being H2O, attacked by multiple realisability (Putnam). Eliminative materialism (the Churchlands) holds that folk psychology is a false theory to be eliminated by neuroscience, attacked as self-refuting and as ignoring folk psychology's indispensability.

Functionalism

Functionalism defines mental states by their causal role: relations between inputs, other internal states and outputs. This builds in multiple realisability (improving on identity theory) and allows genuine inner states (improving on behaviourism). Its main difficulty is qualia: the inverted qualia and absent qualia objections, the latter via Block's China brain (Chinese nation) thought experiment.

Qualia and consciousness

The problem of consciousness is treated head-on. Qualia generate the hard problem (Chalmers): why is physical processing accompanied by any felt experience? The knowledge argument (Jackson's Mary) and the zombie argument both target physicalism. Physicalists reply with the ability hypothesis and acquaintance reply, the new knowledge of an old fact (phenomenal concept) strategy, and the denial that conceivability entails the possibility of zombies.

How the metaphysics of mind is examined

A typical AQA profile for this module:

Short explain questions (3 and 5 marks). Explain intentionality, outline the type identity theory, or explain the knowledge argument.
Twelve mark evaluation. Assess a single objection, such as multiple realisability against identity theory.
Twenty-five mark essays. Sustained evaluation, for example "Is the mind distinct from the body?" or "Can physicalism account for consciousness?", requiring a clear, defended conclusion.

Check your knowledge

A mix of recall and short evaluation questions covering module 4.2.2. Attempt them under timed conditions, then check against the solutions.

Explain what is meant by intentionality and give an example. (3 marks)
Outline Descartes' conceivability argument for substance dualism. (5 marks)
Explain the problem of interaction for substance dualism. (5 marks)
Explain the mind-brain type identity theory. (5 marks)
Outline the multiple realisability objection to the type identity theory. (5 marks)
Explain functionalism using the example of pain. (5 marks)
Outline the inverted qualia objection to functionalism. (5 marks)
Explain the knowledge argument using the example of Mary. (5 marks)

Solutions

Q1: Intentionality is the aboutness or directedness of a mental state: a belief that it is raining is about the rain; a desire for water is directed at water.
Q2: Descartes can clearly and distinctly conceive of his mind existing without his body; whatever can be conceived as separate can exist separately (by God's power); so mind and body are distinct substances.
Q3: A non-physical, unextended mind cannot intelligibly cause physical events (move the arm) or be affected by them (feel pain), and injecting energy into the brain seems to violate the conservation of energy in a closed physical system.
Q4: Each type of mental state is numerically identical to a type of brain state (pain is C-fibre firing), an a posteriori ontological reduction like water being H2O: one thing under two descriptions, not two correlated things.
Q5: The same mental state (pain) can be realised in different physical systems (humans, octopuses, perhaps silicon); if pain were identical to one specific brain state, none of these others could be in pain, which is implausible.
Q6: Pain is the functional state typically caused by bodily damage, related to the belief one is in pain and the desire it stop, and causing avoidance behaviour; it is whatever occupies that causal role, whatever physically realises it.
Q7: Two functionally identical people could have systematically inverted colour experiences (red where the other has green) while all inputs, outputs and dispositions match, so functional role does not fix qualia.
Q8: Mary knows all the physical facts about colour vision from a black-and-white room; on release she learns something new (what it is like to see red); so not all facts are physical, and physicalism is incomplete.

Sources & how we know this

AQA A-level Philosophy (7172) specification — AQA (2017)