Are moral judgements descriptions of moral facts or expressions of attitude?
The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism, moral realism including naturalism and non-naturalism, Hume's is-ought gap and Moore's open question argument and naturalistic fallacy, error theory, and non-cognitivist theories of emotivism and prescriptivism, with the problem of moral motivation.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaethics, covering cognitivism versus non-cognitivism, moral realism (naturalism and non-naturalism), Hume's is-ought gap, Moore's open question argument and naturalistic fallacy, Mackie's error theory, and the non-cognitivist theories of emotivism and prescriptivism.
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What this dot point is asking
AQA wants you to explain what metaethics is, distinguish cognitivism from non-cognitivism, set out moral realism (naturalist and non-naturalist) against anti-realist error theory, deploy Hume's is-ought gap and Moore's open question argument and naturalistic fallacy, and explain the non-cognitivist theories of emotivism and prescriptivism, along with the problem of moral motivation.
Cognitivism and non-cognitivism
Moral realism
- Naturalism. Moral properties are natural properties knowable by ordinary means, so "good" might be reducible to, say, what maximises happiness (utilitarian naturalism) or what fulfils human nature.
- Non-naturalism (Moore). Goodness is a simple, non-natural property, indefinable and known by intuition; moral facts are real but not reducible to natural facts.
Arguments about realism
Error theory
Non-cognitivist theories
- Emotivism (Ayer, "boo/hooray" theory). Moral utterances merely express the speaker's emotions and seek to influence others; "stealing is wrong" expresses disapproval, not a fact.
- Prescriptivism (Hare). Moral judgements are universal prescriptions: to say "stealing is wrong" is to prescribe that no one steal and to commit oneself to that prescription.
The problem of moral motivation
Non-cognitivism explains easily why moral judgements motivate us (they express our attitudes or prescriptions), whereas realism must explain how recognising a fact can move us to act. But non-cognitivism struggles to account for moral disagreement, reasoning and progress, which seem to treat moral claims as true or false.
Mapping the positions
A common exam error is to muddle the three axes the topic runs on, so it pays to keep them apart. The first axis is cognitivism against non-cognitivism, a claim about meaning: are moral judgements truth-apt beliefs or expressions of non-belief states? The second axis is realism against anti-realism, a claim about ontology: are there mind-independent moral facts? The third axis cuts across the first two. Moral realism is cognitivist and anti-relativist (naturalism and Moore's non-naturalism). Error theory is the surprising combination of cognitivism with anti-realism: Mackie agrees moral claims aim at truth but holds they are all false because the objective values they presuppose do not exist. Non-cognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism) is anti-realist by a different route, since it denies moral claims are even in the business of stating facts. Drawing this map explicitly is exactly what distinguishes a confident answer.
The two great negative arguments target the realist axis. Hume's is-ought gap says no valid argument moves from purely factual premises to an evaluative conclusion without an extra evaluative premise, which pressures any attempt to read morality off natural facts. Moore's open question argument and the naturalistic fallacy press the same point semantically: for any proposed definition (good is pleasure, good is what we desire), it remains an open, non-trivial question whether what is pleasant or desired is good, which it would not be if the definition were correct, so good cannot be identified with any natural property. The motivation problem then divides the camps: non-cognitivism explains easily why a sincere moral judgement moves us to act (it just is the expression of a pro- or con-attitude), whereas realism must explain how grasping a fact could motivate, but non-cognitivism in turn struggles with genuine disagreement, reasoning and moral progress, which seem to presuppose that moral claims can be true or false.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of AQA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
AQA 20185 marksExplain the difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism.Show worked answer →
A 5 mark "explain" wants the distinction drawn in terms of meaning and truth-aptness, with an example.
State it: cognitivism holds that moral judgements express beliefs that describe the world (or putative moral facts) and so are truth-apt, capable of being true or false. Non-cognitivism holds that moral judgements do not describe anything and are not truth-apt; they express non-cognitive states such as emotions or prescriptions. Illustrate with "stealing is wrong": the cognitivist reads it as asserting a fact (it has a truth value), the non-cognitivist as expressing disapproval or prescribing that no one steal. Top answers note this is a debate about the meaning of moral language, prior to whether any moral claim is actually true.
AQA 20205 marksOutline Mackie's argument from queerness.Show worked answer →
Markers want both halves of the argument stated as reasons to deny objective values.
Set it out: Mackie's error theory says ordinary moral claims presuppose objective values, and the argument from queerness says no such values exist because they would be too strange to be real. The metaphysical strand: objective values would be entities or properties utterly unlike anything else in the universe, intrinsically action-guiding (to perceive the good would be to be motivated by it), which fits nothing in our naturalistic picture. The epistemological strand: we would need some special faculty of moral intuition to detect them, unlike any ordinary mode of knowledge. Since it is more reasonable to deny such queer things exist than to posit them, objective values do not exist. Top answers keep the metaphysical and epistemological strands distinct.
AQA 202312 marksExplain emotivism and one objection to it.Show worked answer →
A 12 mark "explain" wants an accurate account of the theory and a developed objection, no evaluation verdict required.
Explain emotivism (Ayer): moral judgements are not statements of fact but expressions of the speaker's emotions which also seek to influence others, so "stealing is wrong" expresses disapproval (the "boo/hooray" theory) and is not truth-apt; it draws on logical positivism, since moral claims are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable and so are not factually meaningful. Then develop one objection, the problem of moral disagreement (often via the Frege-Geach point): if moral utterances merely express feeling, it is hard to explain how people can genuinely disagree, reason and argue about morality, and how a moral term keeps a constant meaning in unasserted contexts such as "if stealing is wrong, then getting your brother to steal is wrong". If "stealing is wrong" only vents disapproval, the conditional and the inference look unintelligible. Top answers make the objection bite on emotivism's specific claim that moral terms lack descriptive content.
Related dot points
- Bentham's quantitative hedonistic act utilitarianism and the felicific calculus, Mill's qualitative higher and lower pleasures, the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism, non-hedonistic preference utilitarianism, and the standard objections of calculation, fairness, partiality and the tyranny of the majority.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy moral philosophy, covering Bentham's hedonistic act utilitarianism and the felicific calculus, Mill's higher and lower pleasures, act versus rule utilitarianism, preference utilitarianism, and the major objections including calculation, fairness and the tyranny of the majority.
- Kant's good will and duty, the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity as an end in itself, perfect and imperfect duties, and objections including conflicting duties, the role of consequences and ignoring agent partiality.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy moral philosophy, covering Kant's good will and duty, hypothetical versus categorical imperatives, the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity, perfect and imperfect duties, and objections such as conflicting duties, the neglect of consequences and the problem of partiality.
- Aristotle's account of eudaimonia and the function argument, virtue as a disposition of character, the doctrine of the mean, the role of habituation, practical wisdom (phronesis) and voluntary action, and objections including circularity, guidance, conflicting virtues and cultural relativity.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy moral philosophy, covering Aristotle's eudaimonia and the function argument, virtues as dispositions, the doctrine of the mean, habituation, practical wisdom and voluntary action, and the main objections including the guidance problem, circularity, clashing virtues and relativism.
- The application of utilitarianism, Kantian deontology and Aristotelian virtue ethics to the four AQA issues of stealing, simulated killing, eating animals and telling lies, comparing how each theory treats these cases and the strengths and weaknesses each application reveals.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy moral philosophy on applied ethics, showing how utilitarianism, Kantian deontology and Aristotelian virtue ethics each handle the four set issues of stealing, simulated killing, eating animals and telling lies, and what these applications reveal about each theory.
Sources & how we know this
- AQA A-level Philosophy (7172) specification — AQA (2017)