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4.2.2 Metaphysics of mind

5 dot points across 5 inquiry questions. Click any dot point for a focused answer with worked past exam questions where available.

Is the mind a non-physical thing or property distinct from the body?

Substance dualism and Descartes' conceivability and divisibility arguments, property dualism and the philosophical zombies and knowledge arguments, and the objections to dualism including the problem of interaction, the conceptual problem of causation and the issues of other minds and category mistakes.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind on dualism, covering substance dualism and Descartes' conceivability and divisibility arguments, property dualism and the zombie and knowledge arguments, and objections including the problem of interaction, conservation of energy and category mistakes.
11 min answer →

Are mental states defined by what they do rather than what they are made of?

Functionalism as the view that mental states are functional states defined by their causal role, the input, internal state and output structure and its multiple realisability, the contrast with type identity theory and behaviourism, and the objections from the possibility of inverted qualia and absent qualia and from the China brain or nation thought experiment.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind on functionalism, covering mental states as functional roles defined by inputs, internal states and outputs, multiple realisability, the contrast with identity theory and behaviourism, and the objections from inverted and absent qualia and the China brain thought experiment.
10 min answer →

Can the mind be reduced to behaviour, to the brain, or eliminated altogether?

Logical and analytical behaviourism (Ryle and Hempel), the mind-brain type identity theory and its commitment to ontological reduction, eliminative materialism on folk psychology, and the objections including multiple realisability, circularity, the asymmetry of self-knowledge and the conceivability of disembodied minds.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind on physicalist theories, covering logical and analytical behaviourism, the mind-brain type identity theory, eliminative materialism, and objections including multiple realisability, circularity, the asymmetry of self-knowledge and conceivable disembodied minds.
11 min answer →

Can the subjective, felt quality of experience be captured by a physical account of the mind?

The concept of qualia and the hard problem of consciousness, the knowledge argument (Mary) and the philosophical zombies argument against physicalism, and physicalist responses including the ability and acquaintance replies, the new knowledge of old facts response and the denial that zombies are genuinely conceivable.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind on qualia and consciousness, covering the concept of qualia and the hard problem, the knowledge argument (Mary) and the philosophical zombies argument against physicalism, and the main physicalist responses to each.
11 min answer →

What is the relationship between the mind and the physical body or brain?

What the mind-body problem is, the features of mental states that theories must explain (intentionality, qualia, consciousness and the privacy of mental states), the broad division between dualist and physicalist answers, and the criteria for assessing theories of mind such as causal interaction and conservation of energy.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of mind, mapping the mind-body problem, the features of mental states that any theory must explain (intentionality, qualia, consciousness and privacy), and the broad division between dualist and physicalist theories with the criteria for assessing them.
9 min answer →