Does the existence of evil and suffering disprove the God of classical theism?
The distinction between moral and natural evil, the logical problem of evil (the inconsistent triad) and the evidential problem of evil, and the main theistic responses including the free will defence, soul-making theodicy and the appeal to the limits of human understanding.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of God on the problem of evil, covering moral and natural evil, the logical problem (the inconsistent triad) and the evidential problem, and theistic responses including the free will defence, soul-making theodicy and the appeal to the limits of human understanding.
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What this dot point is asking
AQA wants you to distinguish moral from natural evil, set out the logical problem of evil (the inconsistent triad) and the evidential problem of evil, and evaluate the main theistic responses: the free will defence, the soul-making theodicy, and the appeal to the limits of human understanding.
Moral and natural evil
The logical problem of evil
The evidential problem of evil
The two problems demand different theistic responses, and a strong answer keeps the strategies distinct. Against the logical problem the theist needs only to show that the triad is possibly consistent, that there is some possible morally sufficient reason for God to permit evil; this is a defence, and Plantinga's free will defence is designed precisely to break the strict inconsistency by exhibiting one. Against the evidential problem a mere possibility is not enough, because the atheist concedes consistency and argues from probability; here the theist needs either a positive theodicy (a plausible account of why God actually permits the evils we see, such as soul-making) or a sceptical reply denying we can judge the probabilities at all. Confusing a defence with a theodicy, or deploying a defence against the evidential problem, is a common way to lose marks.
Theistic responses
- The free will defence (Plantinga). Genuine moral good requires free will, and free agents can choose wrongly; a world with free creatures who sometimes do evil is more valuable than a world of pre-programmed puppets. So an omnipotent, good God could have reason to permit moral evil. (Extended to natural evil via the free actions of non-human agents or the conditions free choice requires.)
- The soul-making theodicy (Hick, after Irenaeus). The world is a "vale of soul-making": suffering and challenge are necessary for humans to develop virtues such as courage and compassion and to grow freely towards God. A pain-free world could not produce mature moral character.
- The appeal to the limits of human understanding. We are not in a position to judge that any given evil is genuinely pointless; an omniscient God may have morally sufficient reasons beyond our grasp (a sceptical theist reply to the evidential problem).
Objections to the responses
The free will defence struggles with natural evil, which is not obviously caused by free choices (the standard extensions, that natural evil results from demonic free agents, or that a stable law-governed world is the necessary arena for free choice, strike many as strained), and with Mackie's sharpest point: if it is logically possible for a free agent to choose good on one occasion, it is logically possible for a free agent to choose good on every occasion, so an omnipotent God could have created free beings who always freely do right, and the defence collapses. Plantinga answers with transworld depravity, the bare possibility that every creatable free essence would go wrong in some circumstance, which suffices to defeat the logical problem even if it is improbable. The soul-making theodicy faces the scale and distribution of suffering, including the deaths of infants and the agony of animals who develop no soul. The limits-of-understanding reply risks scepticism about morality: if we cannot tell that any actual evil is pointless, we equally cannot tell that any actual act is good, which undermines ordinary moral judgement and even the believer's grounds for calling God good.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of AQA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
AQA 20175 marksExplain the logical problem of evil as an inconsistent triad.Show worked answer →
Markers want the triad and the reasoning that makes it inconsistent.
State the three propositions: (1) God is omnipotent, (2) God is supremely good, and (3) evil exists. Add the bridging premises Mackie relies on: a good being would want to eliminate all the evil it can, and an omnipotent being is able to eliminate evil entirely. Given these, if such a God existed there would be no evil; since evil plainly exists, the three propositions cannot all be true. The claim is strict logical inconsistency, not mere improbability, which is what distinguishes the logical from the evidential problem.
AQA 20195 marksOutline the free will defence as a response to the problem of evil.Show worked answer →
Markers want the defence stated as a reason God might permit evil.
Genuine moral goodness requires free will, and free agents who can choose good must also be able to choose evil; a world containing freely choosing creatures who sometimes do wrong is more valuable than a world of pre-programmed puppets who cannot do otherwise. So an omnipotent, supremely good God could have a morally sufficient reason to permit moral evil, namely the great good of free will. A strong answer notes Plantinga uses this to rebut the logical problem (it shows the triad is not strictly inconsistent) and flags that it primarily addresses moral, not natural, evil.
AQA 202312 marksExplain the soul-making theodicy and one objection to it.Show worked answer →
A 12 mark question wants the theodicy developed, then an objection pressed.
Soul-making (Hick, drawing on Irenaeus): the world is a "vale of soul-making" in which humans are created immature and develop, through genuine challenge and suffering, the virtues such as courage, compassion and patience, growing freely towards God; a pain-free, risk-free world could not produce mature moral character, so suffering serves a justifying purpose. Objection: the scale and distribution of suffering seem far in excess of what soul-making requires, including the agony of infants and of animals who develop no soul and learn no virtue (Rowe's fawn), and the suffering that crushes rather than ennobles. A strong answer makes the theodicy's logic clear (suffering as instrumentally necessary for growth) before showing the objection targets exactly the gratuitous, growth-defeating suffering the theodicy cannot easily absorb.
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Sources & how we know this
- AQA A-level Philosophy (7172) specification — AQA (2017)