Can God's existence be proved a priori from the very concept of God?
Ontological arguments as a priori and deductive, Anselm's argument that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, Descartes' argument from God as a supremely perfect being, and the objections of Gaunilo's perfect island, Hume and Kant that existence is not a predicate.
A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of God on the ontological argument, covering its a priori deductive form, Anselm's argument, Descartes' argument from a supremely perfect being, and the objections of Gaunilo's perfect island and the Hume and Kant claim that existence is not a predicate.
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What this dot point is asking
AQA wants you to explain the ontological argument as an a priori deductive argument that moves from the concept of God to God's existence, to set out Anselm's and Descartes' versions, and to evaluate the main objections: Gaunilo's parody of the perfect island and the Hume and Kant claim that existence is not a predicate.
The form of the argument
This makes it unique among the arguments AQA studies. The design and cosmological arguments are a posteriori: they start from observed features of the world (order, causation, contingency) and could in principle be undercut by discovering the world is otherwise. The ontological argument starts from nothing but a concept, so if it works it proves not just that God exists but that God exists necessarily, in every possible world, and that the atheist contradicts himself. That ambition is also its vulnerability: a sound a priori proof of a concrete existing being would be remarkable, and most of the objections charge that the argument smuggles existence into a definition rather than establishing it.
Anselm's argument
Descartes' argument
Objections
- Gaunilo's perfect island. Gaunilo parodies Anselm: by the same reasoning, "the greatest conceivable island" would have to exist, since existing is greater than not existing. Since that conclusion is absurd, the argument form must be flawed. (Anselm replies the argument works only for a being whose greatness is unlimited, not for a contingent thing like an island.)
- Existence is not a predicate (Hume and Kant). Kant argues that existence is not a real predicate: saying a thing exists adds nothing to its concept, it only posits that the concept is instantiated. "A hundred real thalers contain no more than a hundred possible thalers." So you cannot define a thing into existence; the concept of God does not, by itself, entail that God exists.
- Hume's empiricist point. Existence claims are matters of fact, knowable only a posteriori; no existence can be proved by reason alone, since its negation is never a contradiction. Whatever we can conceive as existing we can equally conceive as not existing, so "God does not exist" is never self-contradictory, and the ontological argument's claim of necessity collapses.
These objections target different premises, and a strong evaluation keeps them apart. Gaunilo grants the form of the argument and shows it proves too much, so the theist must explain why the argument works for God but not for islands or any "greatest conceivable" thing (Anselm and later Plantinga appeal to necessary rather than maximal existence, which only a non-contingent being can possess). Kant and Hume attack a premise, denying that existence is the kind of property that can belong to a concept at all; if they are right, no appeal to necessity helps, because the whole strategy of reading existence out of a definition is mistaken. Modern modal versions (Plantinga's argument from a possible maximally great being) reframe the issue around whether God's existence is so much as possible, which is where contemporary debate focuses.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of AQA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
AQA 20175 marksOutline Anselm's ontological argument.Show worked answer →
Markers want the argument as a numbered chain, not just the slogan.
Set it out: (1) God is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"; (2) even the fool who denies God has this concept in his understanding; (3) a being that exists in reality is greater than one existing only in the understanding; (4) so if God existed only in the understanding, a greater being could be conceived (the same being existing in reality); (5) but that is a contradiction, since God is by definition the greatest conceivable being; (6) therefore God exists in reality. Stress the reductio structure, the supposition that God exists only in the mind leads to contradiction.
AQA 20205 marksExplain Kant's objection that existence is not a predicate.Show worked answer →
Markers want the objection explained, not just asserted.
Explain: a real predicate adds something to our concept of a thing (being red, being heavy). Kant argues existence is not like this; saying a thing exists adds nothing to its concept, it merely posits that the concept is instantiated. His example: a hundred real thalers contain no more than a hundred possible thalers; the concept is identical, only the instantiation differs. So you cannot pack existence into the definition of God and then read it out as a conclusion, because existence was never part of the concept to begin with. This blocks the ontological argument's key move.
AQA 202312 marksExplain Descartes' ontological argument and Gaunilo's objection to the argument form.Show worked answer →
A 12 mark question wants Descartes set out accurately, then the parody pressed.
Descartes: God is by definition a supremely perfect being; existence is a perfection; so a supremely perfect being lacking existence would be a contradiction, just as a triangle whose angles did not sum to two right angles, or a mountain without a valley, would be; therefore God necessarily exists. Gaunilo (responding to Anselm, but the form transfers): apply the same reasoning to "the greatest conceivable island", and you must conclude it exists, since existing is greater than not existing; that conclusion is absurd, so the argument form is fallacious. A strong answer reports Anselm's reply, that the argument works only for a being whose greatness is unlimited and necessary, not for a contingent thing like an island, and judges whether that reply rescues Descartes too.
Related dot points
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A focused answer to AQA A-Level Philosophy metaphysics of God on the concept of God, covering omniscience, omnipotence and supreme goodness, the paradox of the stone, the Euthyphro dilemma, and whether the divine attributes are compatible with each other and with free will and foreknowledge.
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Sources & how we know this
- AQA A-level Philosophy (7172) specification — AQA (2017)