AQA A-Level Philosophy 4.2.2 Metaphysics of mind overview quiz quiz

Qualia, the felt qualitative character of an experience

Consciousness, the general property of being aware

Intentionality

Privacy, the idea that only the subject can access the state

The mind is identical to the brain

The mind is just a set of behavioural dispositions

The mind is a functional state

The mind is a distinct non-physical substance

The body is divisible but the mind is not

The mind can be doubted but the body cannot

The mind is extended but the body is not

The body thinks but the mind does not

The problem of other minds

The problem of interaction

The category mistake

Multiple realisability

Brain states identical to a particular type of neural activity

Functional roles defined by their causes and effects

Behaviour and dispositions to behave

Non-physical properties of a wholly distinct mental substance

A behavioural disposition to act in certain ways

A non-physical property of a distinct mental substance

A functional role that can be realised by many systems

Numerically identical to a type of brain state

The mind-brain type identity theory

Functionalism, which defines mental states by their causal role

Substance dualism, which posits a distinct non-physical substance

Property dualism, which posits non-physical properties of the brain

A true and complete theory of the mind that needs no revision at all

A radically false theory whose posits should be eliminated

A theory that is straightforwardly reducible without loss to neuroscience

A set of non-physical properties belonging to a distinct mental substance

By its underlying physical composition and the specific brain matter that realises it

By the outward behaviour it produces alone, with no reference to inner states

By its causal role: relations to inputs, other states and outputs

By the irreducible non-physical quality that it possesses over and above the physical

Inverted qualia

The problem of interaction

Circularity

Absent qualia

Something new: what it is like to see red

A new physical fact about the wavelengths of light that she had not known before

That she had simply forgotten some of the physics she had learned in her room

That colour does not really exist and is merely an illusion of the mind

The phenomenal concept strategy

The ability hypothesis

The denial that zombies are conceivable

The acquaintance reply