What do moral words like 'good' actually mean, and are moral statements true or just expressions of feeling?
Meta-ethics: ethical naturalism, intuitionism (Moore's naturalistic fallacy), and emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson), with their strengths and weaknesses.
A WJEC A-Level Religious Studies study of meta-ethics: ethical naturalism, intuitionism (G. E. Moore, the naturalistic fallacy and the open-question argument), and emotivism (Ayer and Stevenson), with the strengths and weaknesses of each theory of moral language.
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What this dot point is asking
This WJEC theme is meta-ethics: not which actions are right, but what moral language means and whether moral statements are true. You need three theories: ethical naturalism, intuitionism (with Moore's naturalistic fallacy), and emotivism (Ayer and Stevenson). AO1 wants accurate exposition of each; AO2 wants a reasoned judgement on which best explains moral language. The key distinction is cognitive (moral statements state facts) versus non-cognitive (they do not).
The answer
The cognitive/non-cognitive divide
Ethical naturalism
Its strength is that it makes morality objective and a matter of knowledge, fitting our sense that some moral claims are simply true. Its weakness is Moore's charge of the naturalistic fallacy: it is always an open question whether something natural (pleasant, desired) is good, which suggests "good" cannot just mean that natural property.
Intuitionism
Intuitionism keeps morality objective while avoiding the naturalistic fallacy. Its weakness is the obscurity of intuition: it does not explain how we intuit good, why intuitions conflict across people and cultures, or how to settle such conflicts.
Emotivism
Its strength is its honesty about the emotional and persuasive force of moral language and its fit with Logical Positivism. Its weakness is that it appears to abolish moral truth and knowledge: if "genocide is evil" is just an expression of feeling, there seems no way to say one moral view is correct and another mistaken, and moral reasoning becomes mere persuasion. Stevenson's reply is that we can still reason about the facts that underlie attitudes.
Examples in context
Model paragraph (does emotivism leave us unable to condemn atrocities?). The most troubling objection to emotivism is that it seems to strip moral judgements of the authority we take them to have: if "the Holocaust was evil" only expresses revulsion and tries to spread it, then it is not true, and there is apparently no fact of the matter that the persecutors got wrong. This consequence strikes many as a decisive cost, since we ordinarily think such judgements are not merely strong feelings but correct. Emotivists respond on two fronts. First, the objection assumes there are moral facts to be lost, but Moore's naturalistic fallacy and Ayer's verificationism give real reasons to doubt that "good" names any property, natural or non-natural, so emotivism may simply be facing the truth honestly. Second, Stevenson's version shows that moral disagreement is rarely bare clashing of feeling: it usually rests on disagreement about facts (what was done, with what effects), about which we can reason, so moral argument survives even without moral facts. A strong evaluation therefore weighs the intuitive cost of denying moral truth against the genuine difficulty, pressed by Moore and Ayer, of saying what moral truth could consist in, concluding that emotivism captures the expressive force of ethics but strains to honour its apparent objectivity.
Try this
Q1. What is the difference between cognitive and non-cognitive theories? [2 marks]
- Cue. Cognitive theories hold moral statements state facts (true or false); non-cognitive theories hold they do not (they express feelings or prescribe).
Q2. What is the naturalistic fallacy? [2 marks]
- Cue. Moore's charge that it is a mistake to define "good" in natural terms, shown by the open-question argument.
Q3. Evaluate the view that moral statements are nothing more than expressions of emotion. [20 marks]
- What the marker wants. A balanced argument weighing emotivism's honesty and the naturalistic fallacy against the loss of moral truth and reasoning, with a reasoned judgement.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of WJEC exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
WJEC sample20 marksExamine the meta-ethical theories of naturalism, intuitionism and emotivism.Show worked answer →
An AO1 question rewarding clear knowledge of three theories of moral language.
Naturalism: moral statements are factual and can be true or false; "good" can be defined in natural (non-moral) terms (such as what produces happiness), so ethics is a kind of knowledge. It is a cognitive, realist theory.
Intuitionism (Moore): "good" is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property known by intuition; Moore charged naturalism with the "naturalistic fallacy" (defining good in natural terms) and used the "open-question argument".
Emotivism (Ayer, Stevenson): moral statements are not fact-claims but expressions of emotion and attempts to influence others ("boo/hurrah" theory); they are non-cognitive.
Distinguish cognitive (naturalism, intuitionism) from non-cognitive (emotivism) theories and use the technical terms accurately.
WJEC sample20 marks"Emotivism reduces ethics to mere feeling." Evaluate this view."Show worked answer →
An AO2 question testing a balanced argument and a supported judgement.
For: emotivism holds moral statements only express emotion ("stealing is wrong" means "boo to stealing"), so there is no moral truth or knowledge; this seems to make ethics subjective and to leave no way to settle disputes or condemn atrocities.
Against: defenders reply that emotivism describes moral language honestly, that Stevenson's version allows reasoned persuasion about facts, and that the lack of moral facts does not stop moral argument; the naturalistic fallacy gives a serious reason to doubt moral facts.
A judgement might hold that emotivism captures the expressive force of moral language but struggles to account for moral reasoning and disagreement.
Top answers weigh the honesty of emotivism against its loss of moral truth and conclude with reasons.
Related dot points
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A WJEC A-Level Religious Studies study of foundational ethical thought: divine command theory and the Euthyphro dilemma, Aristotelian virtue theory (the golden mean, eudaimonia), and ethical egoism, with the strengths and weaknesses of each approach.
- Natural Moral Law: Aquinas' theory, the four tiers of law, the primary and secondary precepts, real and apparent goods, and the doctrine of double effect.
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A WJEC A-Level Religious Studies study of Kantian ethics: duty and the good will, the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the three formulations of the categorical imperative, and the three postulates of practical reason.
- Utilitarianism: Bentham's act utilitarianism and the hedonic calculus, Mill's qualitative and rule utilitarianism, and the strengths and weaknesses of the theory.
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- Conscience: Aquinas' rational conscience (synderesis and conscientia), Freud's psychological conscience (the super-ego), and the implications for moral decision-making.
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Sources & how we know this
- WJEC GCE AS/A level Religious Studies specification — WJEC (2016)