Free will and moral responsibility: hard determinism, libertarianism and compatibilism (soft determinism), religious determinism and predestination (the Calvinist view), and the implications for moral responsibility.

What this dot point is asking

This WJEC theme asks you to explain and evaluate positions on free will and moral responsibility: hard determinism, libertarianism, compatibilism (soft determinism), and religious determinism and predestination (especially the Calvinist view), and what each means for moral responsibility. The theme links to Philosophy of Religion (omniscience) and to the ethical theories (which all assume some freedom). AO1 wants accurate exposition; AO2 wants a reasoned judgement on whether we are responsible for our actions.

The answer

Hard determinism

If hard determinism is true, praise, blame, reward and punishment must be rethought, since holding people responsible for what they could not avoid seems unjust; some advocate reform-based rather than desert-based punishment.

Libertarianism

Libertarianism fits the strong sense we have of deliberating and choosing, and it underwrites moral responsibility. Its difficulty is explaining how an undetermined choice is not merely random, and reconciling free will with the causal order described by science.

Compatibilism (soft determinism)

Compatibilism preserves moral responsibility within a causal world, which is its strength. Critics object that it redefines freedom too cheaply: if my desires are themselves determined, I am not ultimately free, and "acting on my desires" is not the deep freedom the debate is really about.

Religious determinism and predestination

Predestination appears to threaten free will and moral responsibility: if one's eternal destiny is fixed by God's decree, human choices seem unable to make a difference, which raises questions about the justice of reward and punishment. Defenders reply that the elect still act voluntarily, from their own renewed nature, so they remain responsible; that God's election or foreknowledge is not the same as coercion; and that the human and divine perspectives may both be valid.

Examples in context

Model paragraph (does predestination abolish responsibility?). The conflict between predestination and moral responsibility turns on whether divine determination is a kind of coercion. If God has unconditionally decreed each person's eternal destiny before they act, it can look as though human choices are mere theatre, and the justice of damning the non-elect for sins they were never free to avoid becomes hard to defend, which is the heart of the objection. The strongest reply is compatibilist: responsibility does not require that an action be uncaused, only that it flows from the agent's own will without external compulsion, and the Calvinist insists that the elect and the reprobate both act willingly, according to their own nature, so they own their actions even though God ordains the outcome. This parallels the secular compatibilist's claim that determined choices can still be free. The objection presses back that being determined by God to a destiny one cannot alter is precisely the kind of constraint that undermines desert, and that calling such action "voluntary" redefines freedom too thinly. A strong evaluation therefore judges that strong predestination does threaten ultimate responsibility, while granting that the compatibilist and "two perspectives" replies soften the conflict enough to keep ordinary responsibility intact.

Try this

Q1. What does hard determinism conclude about moral responsibility? [2 marks]

• Cue. That free will is an illusion and no one is ultimately morally responsible, since all choices are caused.

Q2. How does compatibilism define freedom? [2 marks]

• Cue. Acting according to your own desires and character without external constraint or compulsion.

Q3. Evaluate the view that human beings are not truly free. [20 marks]

• What the marker wants. A balanced argument weighing hard determinism and predestination against libertarianism and compatibilism, with a reasoned judgement on freedom and responsibility.