What is a miracle, and can it be rational to believe that miracles happen?
Miracles: definitions (Aquinas, Hume, Holland, Swinburne), Hume's argument against belief in miracles, and the responses of Swinburne and others.
A WJEC A-Level Religious Studies study of miracles: competing definitions (Aquinas, Hume's violation of natural law, Holland's contingency view, Swinburne), Hume's argument that it is never reasonable to believe a miracle report, and the responses of Swinburne and others.
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What this dot point is asking
This WJEC theme asks you to explain and evaluate beliefs about miracles. You need the competing definitions (Aquinas, Hume, Holland, Swinburne), Hume's argument that it is never reasonable to believe a miracle report, and the responses of Swinburne and others. AO1 wants accurate exposition of the definitions and arguments; AO2 wants a reasoned judgement on whether belief in miracles can be rational.
The answer
Definitions of "miracle"
- Aquinas. A miracle is an event "done by God beyond the order of created nature". Aquinas gave three kinds: events nature could never do (the sun going back); events nature could do but not in that order (recovery from a fatal illness); and events nature could do but which God does without the usual natural means (an instant cure).
- Hume. A miracle is "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity". This violation definition makes a miracle a breaking of natural law by God.
- Holland. A miracle can be a remarkable and beneficial coincidence that is interpreted religiously, without any law being broken. His example is a child whose toy car stops on a railway line and the train halts in time, by ordinary causes, yet experienced by the mother as a miracle (the contingency definition).
- Swinburne. A miracle is an event of religious significance brought about by God, a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature.
Hume's argument against belief in miracles
Hume adds four practical ("a posteriori") points: no miracle has enough reliable, educated, numerous witnesses; humans love wonder and so spread marvellous tales; miracles abound among "ignorant and barbarous" peoples; and the miracle claims of rival religions cancel each other out, since each supports a different faith.
Responses to Hume
- Swinburne. Laws of nature can have non-repeatable counter-instances: if an event genuinely will not recur and cannot be fitted into a revised law, it is reasonable to regard it as a violation. With multiple, independent testimony, physical traces and a fitting religious context, the evidence for a miracle can outweigh Hume's general rule. Swinburne also notes that historical evidence, apparent memory and testimony are normally trusted, so blanket scepticism is inconsistent.
- The definition objection. Hume arguably begs the question: if a "law of nature" is by definition exceptionless, then a counter-instance just shows the "law" was wrong, so a miracle is impossible by definition. A more open account of laws (Swinburne's) avoids this.
- The clashing-religions point. Critics reply that miracles need not endorse a whole religion, so they do not simply cancel out.
Examples in context
Model paragraph (does Hume rule miracles out unfairly?). The strength and the weakness of Hume's case lie in the same move: defining a miracle as a transgression of a law of nature established by uniform experience. This makes the evidential deck stack automatically against any report, since the very uniformity that defines the law is, by definition, evidence that the reported event does not happen. Critics argue this is question-begging, because if even the best-attested counter-instance is dismissed as a mistake about the law, then no possible evidence could ever establish a miracle, and Hume has settled the question in advance rather than weighing it. Swinburne's reply is to loosen the concept of a law so that a genuinely non-repeatable counter-instance is possible, which lets strong testimony and physical evidence count. Yet Hume's deeper point survives: extraordinary claims do demand extraordinary evidence, and most actual miracle reports fail his practical tests. A strong evaluation therefore separates Hume's reasonable demand for strong evidence, which stands, from his apparent ruling-out of miracles in principle, which is contestable.
Try this
Q1. Give Hume's definition of a miracle. [2 marks]
- Cue. "A transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity."
Q2. What is Holland's "contingency" view of miracles? [2 marks]
- Cue. A remarkable, beneficial coincidence interpreted religiously, with no law of nature broken.
Q3. Evaluate the view that it is never reasonable to believe in miracles. [20 marks]
- What the marker wants. A balanced argument weighing Hume's uniform-experience case and practical points against Swinburne's reply and the definition objection, with a reasoned judgement.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of WJEC exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
WJEC sample20 marksExamine different definitions of the term 'miracle'.Show worked answer →
An AO1 question rewarding precise knowledge of competing definitions.
Aquinas: a miracle is an event done by God beyond the order of created nature; he gave three kinds (events nature could never do, events nature could do but not in that order, and events nature could do but God does without nature's usual means).
Hume: a miracle is "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity", the famous "violation" definition.
Holland: a miracle can be a remarkable and beneficial coincidence interpreted religiously (the "contingency" view, illustrated by the child on the railway line) without breaking any law of nature.
Swinburne: a miracle is an event of religious significance brought about by God, a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature.
Distinguish "violation" definitions from coincidence and significance definitions clearly.
WJEC sample20 marks"Hume was right that it is never reasonable to believe in a miracle." Evaluate this view.Show worked answer →
An AO2 question testing a balanced argument and a supported judgement.
For Hume: the laws of nature rest on uniform experience, which is the strongest possible evidence; testimony to a miracle is always weaker than this, so the wise proportion belief to evidence and reject the report; Hume adds practical points (unreliable witnesses, the love of wonder, that miracle claims of rival religions cancel out).
Against: Swinburne argues laws can have non-repeatable counter-instances, and that strong, multiple testimony plus religious context can outweigh Hume; Hume's definition begs the question by making a miracle impossible by definition; and his dismissal of all testimony is too sweeping.
A judgement might hold that Hume rightly demands strong evidence but wrongly rules miracles out in principle.
Top answers weigh Hume against Swinburne and conclude with reasons.
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Sources & how we know this
- WJEC GCE AS/A level Religious Studies specification — WJEC (2016)