When we say something is 'good', are we describing a fact, expressing a feeling, or issuing a command?
Meta-ethics: the meaning of ethical language, including naturalism, intuitionism (Moore's naturalistic fallacy), and non-cognitivist theories of emotivism (Ayer) and prescriptivism (Hare).
An AQA A-Level Religious Studies answer to meta-ethics, covering ethical naturalism, Moore's intuitionism and the naturalistic fallacy, Ayer's emotivism and Hare's prescriptivism, with strengths and weaknesses of each.
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What this dot point is asking
AQA wants you to explain meta-ethics (the meaning of moral language rather than which acts are right) and assess the main positions: naturalism, intuitionism (with Moore's naturalistic fallacy), and the non-cognitivist theories of emotivism (Ayer) and prescriptivism (Hare).
Cognitivism: naturalism and intuitionism
G. E. Moore is a cognitivist but a non-naturalist intuitionist: "good" names a simple, indefinable, non-natural property grasped directly by intuition, just as "yellow" cannot be defined but is simply recognised. He argues that naturalism (and even Mill's identifying the good with the desirable) commits the naturalistic fallacy of trying to define good in terms of a natural quality, and supports this with the open-question argument: for any natural definition such as "good means pleasure", it always remains a sensible, open question to ask "but is pleasure actually good?", which shows the two are not identical in meaning. Later intuitionists such as W. D. Ross add that we grasp a set of prima facie duties by intuition. The obvious objection is that intuitions conflict between people and cultures and offer no way to settle moral disputes.
Non-cognitivism: emotivism
C. L. Stevenson developed emotivism into a more sophisticated form, distinguishing the descriptive and emotive meaning of moral terms and stressing their use to influence others' attitudes. The strength of emotivism is that it explains the heat of moral disagreement and the action-guiding, persuasive force of moral language; the weakness is that it seems to reduce ethics to mere feeling, makes genuine moral reasoning impossible (if "X is wrong" only means "boo to X", there is nothing to argue about), and inherits the problems of the verification principle on which Ayer's version rests.
Non-cognitivism: prescriptivism
Prescriptivism keeps the action-guiding, universalisable character of moral language (if I say you ought to do X, I commit myself to saying anyone in your position ought to do X) while denying that moral statements report facts. This makes it more rational than emotivism, since universalisability allows for consistency and argument. The remaining objection is that a fanatic could universalise a repugnant prescription (Hare's own example of a consistent Nazi), so universalisability alone does not guarantee morally acceptable conclusions.
Exam-style practice questions
Practice questions written in the style of AQA exam questions on this dot point, with worked answer explainers. The year tag is the paper they imitate, not the source.
AQA 20195 marksExplain Moore's naturalistic fallacy and the open-question argument.Show worked answer →
A 5-mark Paper 2 (Ethics) AO1 question. Markers want the fallacy stated and the open-question argument used to support it.
The naturalistic fallacy is the mistake of defining the moral property "good" in terms of a natural property (such as "pleasant" or "desired"), thereby reducing an evaluative term to a descriptive one. Moore argues "good" is a simple, indefinable, non-natural quality known by intuition, like "yellow". The open-question argument supports this: for any proposed natural definition ("good means pleasant"), it always remains a genuinely open, sensible question to ask "but is what is pleasant actually good?". If the definition were correct the question would be closed (trivial), so no natural definition captures "good". Strong answers note Moore is a cognitivist non-naturalist.
AQA 202220 marks'Ethical statements are simply expressions of emotion.' Assess this view.Show worked answer →
A 20-mark Paper 2 essay, mainly AO2. Reward a balanced argument across cognitivist and non-cognitivist positions.
Set out emotivism (Ayer's "boo/hurrah" theory: moral statements express and evoke feeling, following the verification principle) as the view in question. Then evaluate. For: it explains the motivational force of moral language and why disagreement is so heated. Against: it seems to reduce ethics to mere feeling, cannot account for genuine moral reasoning and argument, and rests on the discredited verification principle; Hare's prescriptivism keeps non-cognitivism while adding universalisable prescription; cognitivists (naturalism, Moore's intuitionism) hold moral claims are truth-apt. Judge, for example, that emotivism captures part of moral language (its expressive force) but cannot be the whole story, since we reason about morality. Top-band work contrasts emotivism with prescriptivism rather than treating them as identical.
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Sources & how we know this
- AQA A-level Religious Studies (7062) specification — AQA (2016)